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Ontario Civil Justice Reform in the Wake of COVID-19: Inspired or
Institutionalized?
Abstract
On 17 March 2020, Ontario’s courthouses shut their doors as the civil justice system locked down with the
rest of the province. Regular court operations were suspended due to the state of emergency caused by
the COVID-19 pandemic. This was followed by a flurry of activity as courts drew up plans to resume
operations as soon as possible. The “new normal” became virtual hearings, either by video conference, in
writing, or by telephone. As Attorney General Douglas Downey said, “We’ve modernized the legal system
by about 25 years in 25 days.” Has the revolution arrived? Will the changes made in response to the
pandemic become permanent? Will they be sufficient to address the problems of cost and delay that
plague the civil justice system? This article will posit that many of these changes are likely to become
permanent. However, the extent and effectiveness of change will depend on the ability of “policy
entrepreneurs” to use this moment of crisis to overcome institutional inertia in the Ministry of the
Attorney General (MAG) and professional resistance in the Bar. This is not the first time that “dramatic
innovation[s]” have been made in response to a crisis in the civil justice system, as evidenced by the
history of reform in that area. Lasting change will not come easily. Furthermore, while these changes are
welcome, they are insufficient to address the crippling backlog facing the courts. A functioning civil
justice system is essential to a functioning democracy, and Ontario’s civil justice system is fundamentally
broken. The “paradigm shift” needs to go further. We need to entirely change our conception of how
courts work, the nature of procedural justice, and our understanding of access to justice and how to
facilitate it. The answer I propose, as Richard Susskind and others have, is a system of online courts,
where human judges hear evidence and arguments and render decisions by way of an online platform, all
within a public dispute resolution (court or tribunal) system. British Columbia’s Civil Resolution Tribunal
(BC CRT) is an excellent example. I argue that, as in BC, online courts could be initiated incrementally,
alongside the current system, and thereby bypass and address many of the issues facing the current
court system. I conclude with some thoughts for the future. Much has been written on the subject of
online courts, and the COVID-19 crisis in Ontario has precipitated numerous blogs and online articles.
However, no-one has yet conducted a deep analysis of the changes in Ontario and what they mean for our
court system. More importantly, my article fills a gap in the literature on online courts in general, none of
which has considered the history of civil justice reform and the nature of institutional change.
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Ontario Civil Justice Reform in
the Wake of COVID-19: Inspired or
Institutionalized?
SUZANNE E CHIODO*
On 17 March 2020, Ontario’s courthouses shut their doors as the civil justice system locked
down with the rest of the province. Regular court operations were suspended due to the state
of emergency caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. This was followed by a flurry of activity as
courts drew up plans to resume operations as soon as possible. The “new normal” became
virtual hearings, either by video conference, in writing, or by telephone.
As Attorney General Douglas Downey said, “We’ve modernized the legal system by about
25 years in 25 days.” Has the revolution arrived? Will the changes made in response to the
pandemic become permanent? Will they be sufficient to address the problems of cost and
delay that plague the civil justice system?
This article will posit that many of these changes are likely to become permanent. However,
the extent and effectiveness of change will depend on the ability of “policy entrepreneurs”
to use this moment of crisis to overcome institutional inertia in the Ministry of the Attorney
General (MAG) and professional resistance in the Bar. This is not the first time that “dramatic
innovation[s]” have been made in response to a crisis in the civil justice system, as evidenced
by the history of reform in that area. Lasting change will not come easily.
Furthermore, while these changes are welcome, they are insufficient to address the crippling
backlog facing the courts. A functioning civil justice system is essential to a functioning
democracy, and Ontario’s civil justice system is fundamentally broken. The “paradigm shift”
needs to go further. We need to entirely change our conception of how courts work, the nature
of procedural justice, and our understanding of access to justice and how to facilitate it.

*

Assistant Professor, Western Law, London, Ontario. I thank Michael Lesage and Charles
Feldman for their comments on drafts of this paper, as well as Justice David M Brown for his
time and insights. All errors are the author’s own.
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The answer I propose, as Richard Susskind and others have, is a system of online courts,
where human judges hear evidence and arguments and render decisions by way of an online
platform, all within a public dispute resolution (court or tribunal) system. British Columbia’s
Civil Resolution Tribunal (BC CRT) is an excellent example. I argue that, as in BC, online
courts could be initiated incrementally, alongside the current system, and thereby bypass
and address many of the issues facing the current court system. I conclude with some
thoughts for the future.
Much has been written on the subject of online courts, and the COVID-19 crisis in Ontario
has precipitated numerous blogs and online articles. However, no-one has yet conducted
a deep analysis of the changes in Ontario and what they mean for our court system. More
importantly, my article fills a gap in the literature on online courts in general, none of which
has considered the history of civil justice reform and the nature of institutional change.
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What if some extra-ordinary event occurred, and one day we woke up to fnd
that all our courthouses had crumbled to the ground and we had to replace every
courthouse in this province? What would we re-build in their place?1
THESE PRESCIENT REMARKS by Te Honourable Justice David Brown of the
Court of Appeal for Ontario came to fruition on 17 March 2020. Te courthouses
of the province continued to stand, but their doors were shut by the state of
emergency caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Following the suspension of all
regular operations in mid-March, a furry of activity ensued as courts drew up

1.

Justice David M Brown, “Some Toughts on Creating a Sustainable Public Civil Justice
System” (Paper delivered at the Ontario Bar Association (OBA) Civil Litigation and
Insurance Sections End of Term Dinner, Toronto, 11 June 2014) [unpublished] at para 7.
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plans to resume operations as soon as possible. Te “new normal” became virtual
hearings, either by video conference, in writing, or by telephone.
As Attorney General Douglas Downey said, “We’ve modernized the legal
system by about 25 years in 25 days.”2 Has the revolution arrived? Will the changes
made as a response to the pandemic become permanent? Will they be sufcient
to address the problems of cost and delay that plague the civil justice system?
Tis article will address those questions and posit that many of the changes
made are likely to become permanent, but that the extent and efectiveness of
change will depend on a number of factors. I will also argue that the changes are
insufcient to address the crippling backlog facing the courts, and that a more
transformational response is required in order to ensure a functioning civil justice
system, which is essential to a functioning democracy.
I will begin with an overview of Ontario’s civil justice system prior to the
pandemic. Tis reveals a system that is fundamentally broken due to cost,
delay, and inaccessibility. I will then review the changes that have been wrought
by the pandemic, such as virtual hearings. Te next section of the article will
consider whether those changes will become permanent, as well as some of the
arguments for and against procedural change. I go on to look at the roadblocks
and facilitators of modernization. Roadblocks include institutional inertia in the
Ministry of the Attorney General (MAG) and professional resistance in the Bar,
both of which have hampered so-called “dramatic innovation[s]”3 that have been
attempted in decades past. Facilitators include “policy entrepreneurs” that may be
able to use this moment of crisis to efect lasting change.
Te next section of the article posits that digitizing existing processes will
not be enough to address the cost, delay, and inaccessibility endemic to our civil
justice system. Te “paradigm shift” needs to go further. We need to entirely
change our conception of how courts work, the nature of procedural justice,
and our understanding of access to justice and how to facilitate it. Te answer
I propose, as Richard Susskind and others have, is a system of online courts,
where human judges hear evidence and arguments and render decisions by way
of an online platform, all within a public dispute resolution (court or tribunal)

2.
3.

Te Canadian Press, “COVID-19 pandemic forces an Ontario justice system ‘stuck in the
1970s’ to modernize” (29 April 2020), online: CBC <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/
ontario-courts-modernize-1.5549850>.
Ontario, Ministry of the Attorney General, Civil Procedure Revision Committee, Report
of the Civil Procedure Revision Committee (MAG, 1980) (Chair: Walter B Williston) at 27,
online: Internet Archive <archive.org/details/mag_00003004/page/n1/mode/2up> [Civil
Procedure Revision].
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system.4 British Columbia’s Civil Resolution Tribunal (BC CRT) is an excellent
example. I argue that, as in BC, online courts could be initiated incrementally,
alongside the current system, and thereby bypass and address many of the issues
facing the current court system. I conclude with some thoughts for the future.
Much has been written on the subject of online courts, and the COVID-19
crisis in Ontario has precipitated numerous blogs and online articles. However,
no-one has yet conducted a deep analysis of the changes in Ontario and what
they mean for our court system. More importantly, my article flls a gap in the
literature on online courts in general, none of which has considered the history
of civil justice reform and the nature of institutional change.

I. THE BEFORE TIMES – THE STATE OF CIVIL JUSTICE
PRE-COVID
Civil justice was in crisis in Ontario long before COVID-19 arrived. Te Rules
of Civil Procedure5 have not changed signifcantly since at least the 1980s,6 and
the system is poorly structured and chronically underfunded. Because funding
decisions and structural reorganization are the purview of the MAG, it is this
Ministry that holds the key to any signifcant change.
In 1976, the White Paper on Courts Administration spoke of “the caseload
crisis facing the courts of this province [which] has the potential to seriously
undermine the quality of justice in Ontario.”7 Despite subsequent changes which
will be discussed further below, delays and issues of access to justice have only
increased. Canada ranks 100 out of 189 countries that are part of the World
Bank’s Enforcing Contracts indicator,8 and its civil justice system scored just 0.47

4.

5.
6.

7.
8.

Richard Susskind, Online Courts and the Future of Justice (Oxford University Press, 2019)
at 6, 60-61. Much of the literature considers technical issues of architecture and design of
online courts, as well as the implementation of artifcial intelligence. Tese issues, while
crucial, are beyond the scope of this article.
Rules of Civil Procedure, RRO 1990, Reg 194 [Rules].
Changes to the Rules are made by the Civil Rules Committee, which is made up of judges,
lawyers, and court services representatives. Te Committee is independent of the MAG and
is authorized by statute to make new rules of procedure, but these rules cannot change the
substantive law.
Ontario, Ministry of the Attorney General, White Paper on Courts
Administration (MAG, 1976).
“Doing Business: Enforcing Contracts Indicator,” online: Te World Bank <www.
doingbusiness.org/en/data/exploretopics/enforcing-contracts> [perma.cc/D83W-7NXT].
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out of 1.0 for speed (and 0.57 for accessibility and afordability) in the 2019
World Justice Project Rule of Law Index.9
In the past four years, the average time it takes to dispose of a civil case in
Ontario has gone up by 37 per cent, to an average of 904 days in 2018/2019. For
small claims, the average time for disposition has more than doubled in the past
four years, to an average of 435 days in 2018/2019.10 Te backlog in Ontario’s
courts increases by an average of 23 per cent every year.11 Tis phenomenon is
partly a result of focusing court resources on the criminal justice system, in order
to comply with constitutional time limits post-Jordan.12
Te civil case backlog will only get worse as a result of COVID-19. In the
six weeks following the suspension of the courts in mid-March, the Court of
Appeal for Ontario (ONCA) was down to about 36 per cent of its usual output,13
although matters have improved since then.14 Te output of the Superior Court
of Justice (ONSC) was down much less, although trial activity seemed to have
been put entirely on hold. Te courts face a crippling backlog as they resume
in-person proceedings.15
Te civil justice system is also extremely hard to navigate for non-lawyers.
In family law proceedings in Ontario, approximately 64 per cent of litigants
are self-represented. In civil claims in the ONSC, self-represented litigants
9.
10.
11.
12.

13.

14.

15.

World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index 2019 (World Justice Project, 2019) at 56, online
(pdf ): <worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/fles/documents/ROLI-2019-Reduced.pdf>
[perma.cc/66DE-4K7S].
Ofce of the Auditor General of Ontario, Annual Report 2019: Reports on Correctional
Services and Court Operations, vol 3 (Ofce of the Auditor General of Ontario, 2019) at
98-99 [Auditor General’s Report].
Ibid, Appendix 13 at 138-140.
R v Jordan, 2016 SCC 27. In Jordan, the Supreme Court of Canada laid down a new
framework for compliance with s 11(b) of the Charter (right to be tried within a reasonable
time) in criminal cases. Tere is now a presumptive ceiling of eighteen months between the
charges and the trial in a provincial court without preliminary inquiry, or thirty months in
other cases (ibid).
Interview of Justice David M Brown by Suzanne Chiodo (7 May 2020) [Brown interview].
On 13 May 2020, Justice Roberts of the ONCA reported that more than 100 scheduled
appeals had to be adjourned due to the pandemic. See 4352238 Canada Inc v SNC-Lavalin
Group Inc, 2020 ONCA 303 at para 6 [SNC Lavalin].
Elizabeth Raymer, “Ontario’s court of appeal ramps back up to 15-20 appeals per
week” (10 June 2020), online: Canadian Lawyer <www.canadianlawyermag.com/news/
general/ontarios-court-of-appeal-ramps-back-up-to-15-20-appeals-per-week/330396>
[perma.cc/J7BQ-QCKV].
Te courts began resuming in-person proceedings at the beginning of July 2020. See John
Schofeld, “‘Everything is on the table’ as Ontario eyes a return to courts, says attorney
general” (9 June 2020), online: Te Lawyers Daily <www.thelawyersdaily.ca/articles/19445>.
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outnumber represented litigants by 1.6 to 1. Tey report feeling overwhelmed,
struggling to navigate court forms, inability to determine which resources are
useful out of the volume of information available online, and feeling alienated
from court processes and anxious about court appearances.16 Many litigants
represent themselves because of the cost of legal services. Te average fees for
a two-day trial in Canada were $31,330 in 2015 (they would undoubtedly be
higher today).17 Te median after-tax income of Canadian households in 2019
was $61,400.18 A household must risk half of its annual income just to proceed to
trial in a legal matter.19 It is therefore not surprising that, of the 12 million adult
Canadians that will have a legal problem they consider serious in a given three-year
period, many of them will not rely on the courts to provide a resolution.20
Tese chronic issues of delay, accessibility, and cost had plagued Ontario’s
civil justice system for decades before the COVID-19 pandemic arrived. What
changes has the pandemic wrought?

II. SUSPENDED COURTS, VIRTUAL HEARINGS – CHANGES
NECESSITATED BY THE PANDEMIC
Efective 17 March 2020, as a result of the state of emergency declared by the
Government of Ontario due to COVID-19, the ONSC and other Ontario courts

16. Te statistics in the frst half of this paragraph are taken from Dr Julie Macfarlane, Te
National Self-Represented Litigants Project: Identifying and Meeting the Needs of Self Represented
Litigants (Final Report) (Treasurer’s Advisory Group on Access to Justice, 2013) at 33-34,
53-63, 64-65, 97-104.
17. Shannon Salter & Darin Tompson, “Public-Centred Civil Justice Redesign: A Case Study
of the British Columbia Civil Resolution Tribunal” (2017) 3 McGill J Disp Resol 113 at
118 [Salter & Tompson 2017], citing Michael McKiernan, “Te Going Rate” (1 June
2015), online: Canadian Lawyer <www.canadianlawyermag.com/staticcontent/images/
canadianlawyermag/images/stories/pdfs/Surveys/2015/CL_June_15_GoingRate.pdf>
[perma.cc/MPR8-7T6S]. See also Action Committee on Access to Justice in Civil and Family
Matters, Access to Civil & Family Justice: A Roadmap for Change (Canadian Forum on Civil
Justice, 2013) at 4 [Roadmap].
18. Statistics Canada, “Canadian Income Survey, 2018”, for Canadian families and
unattached individuals, online: <www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/200224/
dq200224a-eng.htm>.
19. Salter & Tompson 2017, supra note 17 at 118.
20. Ibid at 122, citing Ab Currie, Te Legal Problems of Everyday Life: Te Nature, Extent and
Consequences of Justiciable Problems Experienced by Canadians (Department of Justice Canada,
2007) 2 at 10-12.
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suspended their regular courthouse operations.21 Te ONSC and the ONCA
stated that they would use virtual methods to hear urgent matters only.22 In the
ONSC, civil matters scheduled for the immediate future23 were adjourned sine
die, to be rescheduled after 1 June 2020. On 2 April 2020, the ONSC issued
further Notices to the Profession, expanding the scope of matters that would be
heard in each region.
Te courts suspended operations, but they did not close.24 Te ONSC and
the ONCA continued to hear matters in writing, by telephone, and by video
conference, without the need to obtain consent or a court order.25 Electronic
fling became more widely available,26 and service by email is now permitted
without the need for the other party’s consent. Facta can be hyperlinked to cases,

21. Te following timeline is taken from the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, “Consolidated
Notice to the Profession, Litigants, Accused Persons, Public and the Media Re: Expanded
Operations of Ontario Superior Court of Justice, efective May 19, 2020” (13 May
2020), online: SCJ <https://www.ontariocourts.ca/scj/notices-and-orders-covid-19/
consolidated-notice/> as well as the Court of Appeal for Ontario, “Practice Direction
Regarding the Electronic Conduct of Matters during the COVID-19 Emergency” (6 April
2020), online: COA <www.ontariocourts.ca/coa/en/notices/covid-19/practice-directionelectronic-conduct.pdf>.
22. Te ONCA stated it would also hear non-urgent appeals in writing: “COVID-19: Notice to
the Profession and the Public” (17 March 2020). Te ONSC issued notices to the Profession
on 15 March 2020 identifying the types of matters that were considered “urgent.”
23. From 17 March 2020 to 31 May 2020.
24. Te Ontario Small Claims Court was only hearing urgent matters by telephone or
videoconference during the suspension of operations, but subsequently began scheduling
settlement conferences in non-urgent matters. In-court matters for all courts were suspended
up until 6 July 2020.
25. Te ONCA continued to hear matters via the CourtCall service. See Te Court of Appeal
for Ontario, “Notice Regarding Videoconference and Teleconference Appearance Technology
(CourtCall)” (27 March 2020), online: <www.ontariocourts.ca/coa/en/notices/tele-video.
htm>. Te Divisional Court of the ONSC operated on a limited docket but heard cases
virtually at the discretion of the judges. See Superior Court of Justice, “Notice to the
Profession: Divisional Court” (2 April 2020).
26. Ministry of the Attorney General, “Notice to the Legal Profession regarding the Civil Claims
Online service” (23 March 2020). However, other than the documents that could be fled
through the CCO or the Small Claims Court online fling services, the courts only accepted
electronic fling of documents for urgent matters. Counsel and parties also had to fle the
same materials in paper format, with the requisite fling fee, following the resumption of
regular court operations (the same applied to the Small Claims Court). Te ONCA accepted
flings by email.
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without having to fle Books of Authorities. Afdavits can be sworn remotely.27
Judgments, endorsements, and orders of the court became efective the date
they were made, without the requirement to issue and enter formal orders.
Following the implementation of virtual hearings in the ONSC and the ONCA,
the Honourable Geofrey B Morawetz, ONSC Chief Justice, declared that “we
cannot go back”.28
Te Ontario E-Hearings Task Force29 subsequently released its Best Practices
for Remote Hearings, which provides guidance for lawyers about the preparation
and conduct of a virtual hearing.30 Te Attorney General also announced that the
Ontario government would not proceed with the Halton Region Consolidated
Courthouse construction project, and would instead use those funds “to invest
in technology, modernize processes and expand access to justice across the
province” based on the “[e]xperience gained during COVID-19… there is broad
consensus we cannot go back to the way things were done before the public
health emergency.”31 Given that the estimated total capital cost of the project was
expected to be in the range of $200-$499 million, that is a signifcant investment,
although it is doubtful the entire amount will be put towards modernization.32

27. Tis was later confrmed by Schedule 4 (amending the Commissioners for Taking Afdavits
Act) of the COVID-19 Response and Reforms to Modernize Ontario Act, 2020, SO 2020,
c 7 (assented to 12 May 2020).
28. Te Advocates’ Society, “Virtual Fireside Chat with Chief Justice Geofrey B Morawetz”
(6 April 2020).
29. Te E-Hearings Task Force was a collaboration of Te Advocates’ Society (TAS), the OBA,
the Federation of Ontario Law Associations, and the Ontario Trial Lawyers Association. TAS
has since launched a Modern Advocacy Task Force to look at longer-term changes in the
wake of COVID-19; it will report in April 2021.
30. E-Hearings Task Force, Best Practices for Remote Hearings (13 May 2020), online
(pdf ): Te Advocates’ Society <www.advocates.ca/Upload/Files/PDF/Advocacy/
BestPracticesPublications/BestPracticesRemoteHearings/Best_Practices_for_Remote_
Hearings_13_May_2020_FINAL_may13.pdf> at para 7 [Best Practices]. I use the terms
“remote hearing” and “virtual hearing” interchangeably.
31. Ontario, Ministry of the Attorney General, “News Release: Ontario Investing in Innovative
Ways to Modernize the Justice System” (8 May 2020), online: MAG <www.news.
ontario.ca/mag/en/2020/05/ontario-investing-in-innovative-ways-to-modernize-thejustice-system.html>.
32. Te funds will also be used for immediate infrastructure needs at the Milton and Burlington
courthouses: ibid.

CHIODO, ONTARIO CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM 809

III. THE AFTER TIMES: ARE THE CHANGES HERE TO STAY?
Given the projected fnancial investment in the modernization of Ontario’s
justice system, there is hope for the time after COVID-19. Te experience with
virtual hearings also indicates that the After Times are here to stay.
Lawyers and judges who have participated in virtual hearings have reported
positive results.33 Participants have experienced occasional technological
disruptions, and counsel report that they have had to change their way of
presenting because judges receive and hear submissions diferently in a virtual
hearing. Overall, however, “it’s just like whenever you appear at a diferent court
for the frst time.”34 Counsel have also reported that virtual hearings are much
more focused than their in-person equivalents.35
Courts are also adapting to the “new normal”. Te Ontario Commercial
List had 181 audio hearings, 41 video hearings, and 131 hearings in writing
between 17 March 2020 and 28 April 2020.36 During the suspension of court
operations, the ONCA heard appeals in writing as much as possible, with a
short video conference in the minority of cases if judges had questions about
the materials.37 Judges were unsympathetic to arguments that matters could not
proceed by videoconference on the basis that parties needed to be with their
counsel to assist with documents, or that lack of physical presence “deprives the
occasion of solemnity and a morally persuasive environment”.38 In answer to
such arguments, Justice Myers of the ONSC famously retorted, “[i]t’s 2020.”39
He went on to say that becoming profcient with virtual hearings and other
technology is a basic requirement of civil litigators and courts.40

33. Ewa Krajewska and Shaun Laubman, “See you in (Online) Court – Tips for Virtual
Hearings” (30 April 2020), Ontario Bar Association Webinar Series, “Maintaining Your
Litigation Practice in a Remote Work Environment”.
34. Ibid.
35. Sandra Forbes, “Maintaining Your Litigation Practice in a Remote Work Environment” (14
May 2020), Ontario Bar Association Webinar Series.
36. Te Advocates’ Society, “Update on Changes to Commercial List operations in light of
COVID-19” (5 May 2020) at para 3, online (pdf ): Te Advocates’ Society <www.advocates.
ca/Upload/Files/PDF/COVID-19/Ontario/CLUC_Updates_on_changes_to_operations_at_
Commercial_List_in_light_of_COVID_19_May_5_2020_fnal_may15.pdf>.
37. Brown interview, supra note 13.
38. Arconti v Smith, 2020 ONSC 2782 at para 18.
39. Ibid at para 19. Justice Myers noted that for more than twenty years, r 1.08 has provided for
the option of videoconferencing in motions, applications, and trials (ibid at para 20).
40. Ibid at para 33.
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Justice Myers has reviewed the Rules to determine which might require
revision to facilitate potential reforms to Ontario’s civil justice system,41 as part of
a Judicial Working Group of the ONSC.42 Te recommendations are indicative
of a “paradigm shift” away from in-person oral hearings and towards written
advocacy and virtual hearings, using videoconferences and teleconferences.43
In addition to recommending changes to facilitate the implementation of
electronic fling and hearings, they state that “presentation of evidence and
argument orally in open court will no longer be considered the default or even
a superior mode”; instead, in accordance with the principle of proportionality,44
“[t]he default should be the mode that is most expeditious and afordable, having
regard to the nature of the case.”45 For all steps except trial, parties would have
to seek leave for an in-person hearing.46 Applications and summary trials could
become the default, with parties required to show why a trial is necessary for the
fair, expeditious and afordable adjudication of their dispute.47 Since then, the
Superior Court of Justice has indicated that motions on consent, and contested
short motions, are to be heard in writing as the default.48
As discussed further below, this “paradigm shift” away from oral argument
has drawn particular ire from the Bar, partly on procedural justice grounds.
While a hearing by videoconference may serve as an acceptable substitute for
an in-person hearing, telephone or written hearings give rise to objections that
41. Justice Fred Myers & Stephen Cavanagh, List of Rules Potentially Afected by Reforms to
Civil Justice System, Including E-Filing and Virtual Hearings (ONSC Judicial Working
Group, 22 May 2020) [Myers & Cavanagh]. Te Federation of Ontario Law Associations,
representing local law associations across Ontario, is soliciting feedback on the document.
Any changes to the Rules would have to be considered by the Civil Rules Committee.
See supra note 6.
42. Te Working Group is co-chaired by Regional Senior Justices Firestone and MacLeod, and
includes judges from various regions, members of the Bar, and representatives from the MAG
and Court Services Division. See Ontario Bar Association, “Fireside Chat with Superior
Court of Justice” (28 May 2020) [Morawetz Fireside Chat].
43. Myers, supra note 41 at 1.
44. Rules, supra note 5, r 1.04(1.1) states that, “[i]n applying these rules, the court shall make
orders and give directions that are proportionate to the importance and complexity of the
issues, and to the amount involved, in the proceeding” (ibid).
45. Myers, supra note 41 at 3-4; Rules, supra note 5, r 1.08(5)(a). Tis relates to the “general
principle” in r 1.08(5)(a) (regarding teleconference and videoconference hearings) “that
evidence and argument should be presented orally in open court” (ibid).
46. Myers, supra note 41 at 3.
47. Ibid at 8-9, 19.
48. Ontario Superior Court of Justice, “Toronto Expansion Protocol for Court Hearings
During COVID-19 Pandemic” (29 June 2020), online: SCJ <www.ontariocourts.ca/scj/
notices-and-orders-covid-19/notice-to>.
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litigants are losing their “day in court”.49 Others have stated that any curtailment
of the adversarial hearing impinges on the accuracy of the result.50 Critics have
claimed that the move away from traditional oral hearings will result in “second
tier justice.”51
However, according to the proportionality principle,52 which has been part of
the Rules since 2010, not every litigant will be entitled to every procedural step.
Procedures must be tailored to the nature of the dispute. If the proportionality
principle is to address the issues of cost and delay in the civil justice system, then
a paradigm shift—or, as the Supreme Court of Canada called it in Hryniak v
Mauldin, a “culture shift”—is indispensable:53
A fair and just process must permit a judge to fnd the facts necessary to resolve the
dispute and to apply the relevant legal principles to the facts as found. However,
that process is illusory unless it is also accessible — proportionate, timely and
afordable. Te proportionality principle means that the best forum for resolving a
dispute is not always that with the most painstaking procedure.

Te objection that removing key procedural steps somehow renders a process
unfair can be addressed by changing our view of procedural justice. Adrian
Zuckerman and Rabeea Assy have both argued in favour of this paradigm shift,
whereby cost and time are also seen as elements of justice.54 Justice is not done
where it can only be provided to the wealthiest in society, and “justice delayed
is justice denied.”55 If the time and cost of litigation (to all parties) are included
in the defnition of procedural justice, then using technology to make litigation

49. For a summary of these arguments, see Lord Justice Briggs, Civil Courts Structure Review:
Final Report (Courts and Tribunals Judiciary, 2016) at paras 6.77 to 6.84. See also Susskind,
supra note 4 at 206.
50. Tese objections are addressed in AAS Zuckerman, “No Justice without Lawyers: Te Myth
of an Inquisitorial System” (2014) 33 CJQ 355.
51. See Susskind, supra note 4 at 187-91 (Susskind refers to “economy-class justice”).
52. Rules, supra note 5, r 1.04(1.1).
53. Hryniak v Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7 at para 28 [Hryniak]. See also Roadmap, supra
note 17 at 6-9.
54. AAS Zuckerman, “A Reform of Civil Procedure – Rationing Procedure Rather Tan Access
to Justice” (1995) 22 JL & Soc’y 155 at 162 [Zuckerman 1995]; Rabeea Assy, “Briggs’
Online Court and the Need for a Paradigm Shift” (2017) 36 CJQ 70 at 70, 80, 82, 84.
55. Zuckerman 1995, supra note 54 at 162.
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speedier and more afordable actually promotes justice.56 Tis is true even if some
procedural steps must be sacrifced. Proportionality balances the goals of accuracy
and efciency, and thereby enables more justice and more court resources to be
dispensed to a wider segment of society.57
It is the principle of proportionality, then, that militates most in favour of
the shift to virtual hearings. How far will these changes go, and how efective will
they be? Te answers to these questions depend on several factors, some of which
will facilitate civil justice reform, and some of which will stand in its way.

IV. HIGHWAYS AND ROADBLOCKS ON THE PATH TO
MODERNIZATION
A. ROADBLOCKS: INSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE AND PROFESSIONAL
RESISTANCE

Te history of change in the Ontario civil justice system is not encouraging.
Numerous proposals for reform have been produced over the years, yet these have
been largely inefectual. None has led to a reduction in the cost and delay that
plague the justice system, because none has facilitated a fundamental paradigm
shift in the province’s approach to civil justice.
For example, the Rules of Civil Procedure have been modifed on several
occasions. Te Williston Committee’s Report of the Civil Procedure Revision
Committee58 had the mandate of simplifying the language of the Rules and
reducing their number, as well as “developing innovative measures to ensure that
the procedure in civil litigation is understandable by members of the public, the
steps necessary to fnalize a dispute are minimal and the cost of such procedure is
reasonable.”59 While subsequent reform in 1985 changed or clarifed the Rules on

56. Similar sentiments were expressed by Allison Speigel, “How courts can step up to
save drowning civil justice system” (23 April 2020), online: Canadian Lawyer <www.
canadianlawyermag.com/news/opinion/how-courts-can-step-up-to-save-drowning-civiljustice-system/328967>; and by OBA President Colin Stevenson on CHCH-TV, “Inside
the Story: Part 1” (29 May 2020), online: CHCH < https://www.chch.com/shows/
inside-the-story/>.
57. Zuckerman 1995, supra note 54, at 158, 160-62, 167.
58. Civil Procedure Revision, supra note 3.
59. Ibid at 2.
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several points,60 the nearly 300 pages of revisions failed to make any fundamental
changes to the overall process of civil litigation.61 Te MAG’s Civil Justice Review
in 1996 recommended reducing cost and delay through case management,
mandatory mediation, and trial as a last resort, yet civil actions take almost as
long today as they did then.62 Te 2010 changes to the Rules were the result of
the Civil Justice Reform Project completed in November 2007.63 Tey included
a general principle of proportionality, as well as expanded summary judgment
procedures, reforms to reduce costs and delay associated with discovery, and
mandatory pre-trial conferences.64 Again, no fundamental changes were made to
the process of civil litigation in Ontario, and the expanded summary judgment
procedures did not bring about the timely and afordable access to justice that the
SCC called for in Hryniak.65
Tese eforts have largely failed due to institutional governance and professional
resistance, each of which will be addressed below. Without institutional support
and stakeholder buy-in, change is usually limited to “tinkering at the edges”
of reform. Te danger is that the recent changes, incremental as they are, will
sufer the same fate and for the same reasons.
1.

INSTITUTIONAL AND GOVERNANCE ISSUES

Te responsibility for the transformation of Ontario’s civil justice system lies
with the MAG. Unfortunately, as far as the civil justice system is concerned,

60. For a summary of the changes, see ibid at 15-33; Rules, supra note 5, r 1.03(2). Tese include
the introduction of the requirement that “[t]hese rules shall be liberally construed to secure
the just, least expensive and most expeditious determination of every civil proceeding on its
merits” (ibid).
61. Justice David M Brown, “Sacred Cows and Stumbling Blocks: Whither Civil Procedure
Reform?” (Paper delivered at the Law Society of Upper Canada, Toronto, 31 May 2011)
[unpublished] at para 6 [Brown 2011].
62. Ontario, Ministry of the Attorney General, Civil Justice Review, Final Report (Queen’s Printer,
1996). Te average duration of a civil action was thirty-two months at that time, compared
to thirty months today (or 904 days – see above).
63. Honourable Coulter A Osborne, QC, Civil Justice Reform Project (Ministry of the Attorney
General, 2007).
64. Ontario, Ministry of the Attorney General, “Backgrounder: Civil Justice Reform in Ontario”
(Ministry of the Attorney General, 2011) [Backgrounder].
65. Hryniak, supra note 53. Justice David M Brown has noted that, in the wake of Hryniak,
it still takes more than three years for a case to proceed through the ONSC, and it takes an
average of 2.5 years for a case to be disposed of by way of summary judgment. See Justice
David M Brown, “Red block, yellow block, orange block, blue. With so much competition,
what do we do?” (2019) 38 Adv J 14 at paras 10, 15.
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the MAG has shown a consistent track record of institutional malaise and
resistance to change.
Tis can partly be explained by the failure of previous reform projects,
such as the Integrated Justice Project (IJP).66 Tis launched in 1996 with the
aim of creating a centralized online system to coordinate electronic fling, case
management, and courtroom services. Te project experienced signifcant cost
increases and delays, with projected costs almost doubling between March 1998
($180 million) and March 2001 ($359 million).67 Tere were also signifcant
concerns regarding internal audit controls and data privacy.68 Te IJP was
eventually shelved in October 2002, at a cost of $265 million. Its collapse
“has cast a long shadow of fear of failure, paralyzing initiatives to modernize
Ontario’s courts.”69
Te lessons that can be learned from the failure of the IJP will be covered
later in this article. However, the reason the IJP failed was because, like similar
projects in other provinces, it was too ambitious.70 Te project was huge in its
scale and scope, spanning three Ministries (Attorney General, Solicitor General,
and Correctional Services), and afecting approximately twenty-two thousand
employees at 825 diferent locations across Ontario, as well as municipal police
forces, judges, private lawyers, and the general public.71 It attempted to link
up disparate parts of the justice system that had never been integrated either
organizationally or technologically, and relied for most of its funding and
implementation on a partnership with private industry, a form of partnership
that itself was relatively untested.72 Proponents of the IJP described it as “the
largest justice technology project under way in the world today.”73
66. Interview of Justice David M Brown by Suzanne Chiodo (23 May 2020)
[Brown interview 2].
67. Auditor General of Ontario, Annual Report 2001, Chapter 3, Reports on Value for money
(VFM) Audits, 3.03 Integrated Justice Project (Ofce of the Auditor General of Ontario, 2001)
at 69 [Auditor General’s Report 2001].
68. Ibid at 70.
69. Brown interview 2, supra note 66; Kirk Makin, “Computer lawsuit costs Ontario
$63-million”, Te Globe and Mail (1 June 2005), online: <www.tgam.ca/398GIBK>
[Computer lawsuit].
70. Carl Baar, “Integrated justice: privatizing the fundamentals” (1999) 42:1 Canadian Public
Administration 42 at 45-46, 49-52, 54 (describing failed initiatives to integrate systems in
British Columbia and New Brunswick).
71. Auditor General’s Report 2001, supra note 67 at 67.
72. Baar, supra note 70 at 55; Michael Jordan, “Ontario’s Integrated Justice Project: profle
of a complex partnership agreement” (1999) 42:1 Canadian Public Administration 26
at 29 [Jordan].
73. Jordan, ibid, at 27; Auditor General’s Report 2001, supra note 67 at 71-72.
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Even with this acknowledgement, it appears that those responsible for
managing the IJP signifcantly underestimated its complexity and the magnitude
of the change it would bring about, and therefore the time, cost, and consultation
it would require.74 Tis was particularly true with regard to the court system,
which “had been operating with largely paper-based information- and
document-management systems. Te original plan to implement [the IJP] in [an]
eighteen-month period incurred a measure of resistance from court staf and the
Judiciary.”75 Tis resistance, as well as the ballooning of time and cost involved in
the project, meant that it was eventually more cost-efective to shelve it entirely.
Te current-day institutional malaise in the MAG can also be explained
by the division of responsibilities between the judiciary and the Ministry. Te
executive model of courts administration76 means that the staf who provide
administrative services to the courts and the judiciary (such as court fling,
scheduling, and information technology, as well as services in the courtroom
itself ) answer to the Attorney General.77 As a result, most court functions are
beyond judicial control.78 Te judiciary is largely unable to set goals to keep court
administrators accountable, and it lacks discretion over spending. Tis has led to
a lack of measurable goals and objectives and a lack of appropriate infrastructure
for data collection and analysis.79 Judges therefore fnd it very difcult to schedule
and manage cases, because these require that court administrators maintain
materials in a consistent and organized fashion and keep a reliable and accessible
inventory of cases. Tis stymies one of the key efciencies of the civil litigation
process: judicial case management.80
Tese governance issues have also afected the pace of modernization
in the Ontario court system. Te Ministry has been subject to “ongoing,
consistent criticism from [justice] sector stakeholders regarding the pace of

74. Auditor General’s Report 2001, supra note 67 at 70, 76.
75. Ibid at 76.
76. Canadian Judicial Council, Alternative Models of Court Administration (Canadian Judicial
Council, 2006) at 9, cited in Brown 2011, supra note 61 at para 25. Both the CJC Report
and Justice Brown criticize the executive model of courts administration.
77. Auditor General’s Report, supra note 10 at 88.
78. Chief Justice Frank Callaghan, “Te Financing and Administration of the Courts: A Treat
to Justice” (1992) TAS J at 4.
79. See Susskind, supra note 4 at 79. Tis in turn has an impact on the principle of open justice,
which “demands a clear window on the court system” (ibid).
80. Brown 2011, supra note 61 at paras 28-35.
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modernization,”81 yet the court system is still heavily paper-based.82 Tere is no
up-to-date information technology system in the Ontario courts for the fling
and management of court documents, and to track and schedule court cases.
FRANK is a system that tracks criminal, civil, and small claims cases received
by the ONSC, but it has not been updated since 2014.83 It is unable to facilitate
accurate entry of data or generate user-friendly reports. Because judges and court
staf cannot rely on it, they are still dependent on physical fles. Tis afects the
efcient scheduling and management of cases.84 Te poor state of the FRANK

81. Auditor General’s Report, supra note 10 at 104.
82. Ibid at 7 (paper made up more than 96 per cent of the 2.5 million documents fled in the
Ontario court system in 2018-2019). Limited steps towards digitization in Ontario have
included electronic fling of pleadings (and a limited number of other documents) which was
introduced in November 2017. See “File civil case documents online” (last modifed 10 July
2020), online: Government of Ontario <www.ontario.ca/page/fle-civil-claim-online>. Small
claims may also be fled online, see “File small claims online” (last modifed 10 July 2020),
online: Government of Ontario <www.ontario.ca/page/fle-small-claims-online>. Once the
court receives the documents via these portals, they are simply printed out and put in the
paper fle (they are not placed in dedicated electronic fles). Te portals are therefore not part
of an end-to-end digitized system. Te ONCA is currently undergoing a digitization project
by an outside provider; this is predicted to be completed in 2022 (email correspondence to
Suzanne Chiodo from Justice David M Brown, 31 May and 18 June 2020). With regard to
tribunals, the Condominium Authority Tribunal allows for the online fling of applications,
but its jurisdiction is very narrow. Self-funding tribunals such as the Ontario Energy Board
and the Ontario Securities Commission have digitized processes such as electronic fling.
83. Auditor General’s Report, ibid, at 92.
84. Ibid at 85-86, 107-108.
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system has been confrmed by the Auditor General of Ontario,85 the Law
Commission of Ontario,86 and judges that have attempted to use the system.87
Civil servants and institutions play a major role in change processes,88
and their resistance can prove fatal to fundamental reform eforts. Just as the
“capture” of intangible resources such as access to empirical data and knowledge
of organizational culture can assist civil servants in their campaigns for
reform,89 it can also assist them in their attempts to block it. Overcoming such
resistance within the MAG will be essential in the enactment of any lasting civil
justice reform.
2.

RESISTANCE TO CHANGE IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION

Another roadblock to reform is resistance to change in the legal profession.
As Darin Tompson has observed, “the change-resistant culture of most justice
systems is especially pronounced when it comes to new technology. Tis
observation is true for justice system providers such as lawyers, judges and many
alternative dispute resolution providers.”90

85. Te MAG took up to two months to provide the Auditor General with several key
documents, a delay the latter had encountered on previous audits in 2003 and 2008. Te
Auditor General concluded that it was “concerned that these delays are part of a recurring
pattern at the Ministry of the Attorney General” (ibid at 98).
86. See Class Actions, Objectives, Experiences and Reforms (Law Commission of Ontario, 2019)
[LCO Report]. In preparing its report on class actions, the LCO found that the lists of class
action fles taken from the FRANK database (and provided by the MAG) “were inconsistent,
incomplete and contained many inaccuracies and duplications” (ibid at 104). Te MAG
could not provide even a basic record of important milestones in each action, and could not
identify whether a particular case was ongoing, completed, or dormant (ibid at 104). Te
LCO concluded that the Ministry did not have a robust court information system that could
collect and aggregate a broad range of class actions statistics, and that such a system was not
likely to be available in the near future (ibid at 68).
87. Some judicial frustrations have been noted, see Bon Hillier v Milojevic, 2010 ONSC 435
at para 37; Charles Estate (Re), 2009 CanLII 57448 (ONSC) at paras 12-13; Pershadsingh
v Tompson (Trustee of ), 2010 ONSC 4943 at paras 55-60; see Brown 2011, supra
note 61 at para 66.
88. Lucia Quaglia, “Civil Servants, Economic Ideas, and Economic Policies: Lessons from Italy”
(2005) 18 Governance 545 at 559; Kathleen McNamara, “Rational fctions: Central bank
independence and the social logic of delegation” (2002) 25 West Eur Pol 48; Michael King,
“Epistemic communities and the difusion of ideas: Central bank reform in the United
Kingdom” (2005) 28 West Eur Pol 94.
89. Quaglia, ibid, at 546-47.
90. Darin Tompson, “Creating New Pathways to Justice Using Simple Artifcial Intelligence
and Online Dispute Resolution” (2015) 1 Intl J Online Disp Resol 4 at 44.
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In Ontario, for example, lawyers have shown a great deal of resistance to
the imposition of written hearings at the appellate level. Following the ONCA’s
decision in SNC Lavalin, the appellant has moved to have the decision set
aside by a panel of the Court, on the basis that the Rules and the Courts of
Justice Act91 mandate an oral hearing of a civil appeal unless the parties consent
to an appeal in writing.92 Tis resistance has also manifested itself in the Bar
generally.93 Te tradition of oral advocacy is strongly ingrained in lawyers, and
some commentators have noted that the pull of the majesty and collegiality of the
courtroom is also strong.94 Tis may be why, until the pandemic, so few lawyers
used the ONCA’s teleconference and videoconference service (CourtCall).95
While such resistance is by no means universal,96 it could ultimately harm the
legal profession, however, and “[t]he law … risks losing infuence over citizens by
not recognizing how much the online environment needs new justice models.”97
Even worse, any reforms that are implemented may be co-opted by the
very system whose complexities and delays they were introduced to counteract.
A major driver for civil justice reforms such as class proceedings “was the search for
a remedy for an expensive, slow, complex, inaccessible, and overburdened court
system.”98 However, as with ADR, lawyers have used these procedures “not for
91. Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c C-43.
92. SNC Lavalin, supra note 13. See also Carleton Condominium Corporation No 476 v
Wong, 2020 ONCA 244.
93. Cristin Schmitz, “Post-COVID courts could see less oral advocacy, more paper-based
and remote adjudication: SCC’s Wagner” (21 May 2020), online: Lawyer’s Daily
<thelawyersdaily.ca/articles/19174/post-covid-courts-could-see-less-oral-advocacymore-paper-based-and-remote-adjudication-scc-s-wagner> [Schmitz, “Wagner”]; Brown
interview 2, supra note 67; Tom Curry, “Maintaining Your Litigation Practice in a
Remote Work Environment” (14 May 2020), Ontario Bar Association Webinar Series
[Curry]; John Schofeld, “Task force aims to help modernize justice system and role of
advocates” (17 June 2020), online: Lawyer’s Daily <www.thelawyersdaily.ca/articles/19608/
task-force-aims-to-help-modernize-justice-system-and-role-of-advocates>.
94. Schmitz, “Wagner,” supra note 93 (per Federal Court Justice James O’Reilly); Curry, supra
note 93; Brown interview 2, supra note 66.
95. Curry, supra note 93; Brown interview 2, supra note 66. However, this may also be because
CourtCall has experienced numerous technical issues and does not work as well as more
up-to-date technologies such as Zoom.
96. See the motion to the Law Society of Ontario, asking it to lobby the provincial government,
the Civil Rules Committee, and courts administration to adopt innovations such as
electronic fling and remote hearings. Law Society of Ontario, “Notice to the Professions”
(20 March 2020), online: LSO <bit.ly/3hFW6JS>.
97. Ethan Katsh & Orna Rabinovich-Einy, Digital Justice (Oxford University Press, 2017) at
174-75 [Digital Justice].
98. Ibid at 178.
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the accomplishment of a ‘better’ result, but as another weapon in the adversarial
arsenal to manipulate time, methods of discovery, and rules of procedure for
perceived client advantage.”99 As Carrie Menkel Meadow has pointed out, this
is a result of “resolv[ing] disputes using new forms within old structures.”100
Lawyers “infect” new processes with adversarial formalisms such as evidentiary
objections,101 and so the new wine sufers from being put into old wineskins.102
For example, when class proceedings were enacted in the early 1990s, they
were hailed as a panacea to the access to justice problems that were endemic
in Ontario’s justice system,103 including the delays and inconvenience associated
with bringing individual actions for small claims.104 In the nearly three decades
since the CPA was enacted, however, class proceedings have become mired in
delays caused by multi-jurisdictional issues, skirmishes between competing law
frms, and interlocutory appeals. As the Law Commission of Ontario noted in its
recent report, “[m]any of the usual obstacles to access to a judicial determination
in a reasonably timely manner are compounded in the class action setting.
Virtually everyone consulted by the LCO cited delay as a signifcant issue in class
action litigation.”105
Tis phenomenon is also exemplifed by the suspension of the courts during
the pandemic. Lawyers created a new battle-front out of the ONSC’s statement
that it would initially only hear urgent matters, thereby commanding even more
of the court’s limited resources. In Wang v 2426483 Ontario Limited, Justice
Myers observed that “[t]he court is now routinely receiving submissions on the
merits and ostensibly on the issue of “urgency” both before and even after the
court has scheduled a matter for hearing.”106 Tis is one of the reasons why the BC
99. Ibid at 3; see also ibid at 17.
100. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, “Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation
Co-Opted or ‘Te Law of ADR’” (1991) 19 Fla St UL Rev 1.
101. Ibid at 35 and 38.
102. When the BC Civil Resolution Tribunal Act, SBC 2012, c 25, s 20 [CRT Act] was being
debated, it was pointed out that there had previously been a presumption that the Small
Claims Court would only be used by self-represented parties, but that lawyers had become
more ubiquitous over time: BC Legislative Assembly, Ofcial Report of Debates (Hansard),
39-4, p 1738 (8 May 2012) (Leonard Krog).
103. Ministry of the Attorney General, News Release, “Class Proceedings Legislation Expands
Access to Justice” (7 January 1993). See also Suzanne Chiodo, Te Class Actions Controversy:
Te Origins and Development of the Ontario Class Proceedings Act (Irwin Law, 2018) (outlining
the debate and enactment of class proceedings legislation).
104. Ibid at 48, 76.
105. LCO Report, supra note 86 at 5-6, 18, 23, 30, 92.
106. 2020 ONSC 2040, at para 7; see also Haaksma v Taylor, 2020 ONSC 2656.
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CRT does not generally permit users of the system to be represented by a lawyer,
other than in motor vehicle accident cases,107 a decision that was vehemently
opposed by members of the BC Bar.108
Nevertheless, the unique nature of this moment of crisis may mean that
such institutional and professional resistance is overcome. Tis will depend on a
number of facilitators of change.
B. HIGHWAYS – INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL FACILITATORS OF
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

One of the greatest facilitators of change is crisis. As Richard Susskind has said,
“[a]nyone who reads about change theory knows that the frst step to change
is creating a sense of urgency—and this is what the pandemic has done”.109
It was crisis that precipitated the creation of online courts in British Columbia.
Te CRT Act110 was passed when a number of other matters, including trafc
violations and civil forfeiture, were shifted out of the court system and into
administrative tribunals. Tis shift occurred in order to relieve pressure on the
court system.111 For some years previously, delays in the criminal justice system
had led to the stay of proceedings against numerous accused persons, leading to
a public outcry.112 Several reports commented on the “culture of delay”113 that
pervaded the BC justice system generally.114 Te movement of matters from the

107. CRT Act, supra note 102, s 20.
108. Cristin Schmitz, “Tribunal aimed at streamlining deals out lawyers, prompting ire”, Te
Lawyer’s Daily (3 April 2015) (Lexis).
109. Schmitz, “Wagner,” supra note 93.
110. CRT Act, supra note 102.
111. BC Legislative Assembly, Ofcial Report of Debates (Hansard), 39-4 (8 May 2012) at 1449
(Kathy Corrigan) and 1820 (Jagrup Brar).
112. Tis may happen across Canada in the wake of COVID-19: Olivia Stefanovich,
“Justice minister says he’s ready to legislate if pandemic delays lead to charges being
tossed”, CBC News (15 July 2020), online: CBC <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/
stefanovich-jordan-decision-covid19-cases-delay-1.5638893>.
113. A Criminal Justice System for the 21st Century (BC Justice Reform Initiative, 2012) (Chair:
D Geofrey Cowper) at 4 [Cowper Report].
114. British Columbia, Minister of Justice and Attorney General, Modernizing British Columbia’s
Justice System: Green Paper (Ministry of Justice, 2012) at 9; British Columbia, Ministry
of Justice, White Paper on Justice Reform, Part One: A Modern, Transparent Justice System
(Ministry of Justice, 2012) at 3; British Columbia, Ministry of Justice, White Paper on Justice
Reform, Part Two: A Timely, Balanced Justice System (Ministry of Justice, 2012) at 22.
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courts to tribunals was an efort “to obtain greater process efciencies and better
outcomes” in both.115
Te history of change in the Ontario court system, as well as the literature
on institutional change generally, provide useful insights into the factors that
will encourage change now. Te literature on institutional change discusses
endogenous (internal) and exogenous (external) explanations for the timing of
change.116 A key exogenous factor is fnancial crisis.117 Te current COVID-19
crisis has not yet led to fnancial crisis, but that may not be far of.118 Ontario’s
under-resourced justice system is already facing an overwhelming backlog, and
the courts’ inability to function at full capacity—combined with the spike in
litigation that is sure to follow the pandemic —could lead to a breakdown of the
system altogether, leaving it no choice but to modernize.119 As with the BC CRT,
this may open up “a rare window of opportunity” for leaders “to pursue reform
measures that may have been impossible in the absence of crisis”.120
Another exogenous factor is the existence of reform in other infuential
jurisdictions. Institutions operate within the “logic of organizational mimicry”
and reform is “determined by a social process of crossnational institutional
difusion.”121 Trough norm internalization, ideas flter down from supranational
institutions and across from comparable jurisdictions.122 Tis was certainly
true for class actions reform in Ontario in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
115. Cowper Report, supra note 113 at 166; see also ibid at 163-66. Although the Cowper
Report focused on the criminal justice system, it also reviewed the “Policy Context” of the
movement towards tribunals, including the CRT (ibid at 164-65).
116. Caner Bakir & K Aydin Gunduz, “When, Why and How Institutional Change Takes
Place: A Systematic Review and a Future Research Agenda on the Importance of Policy
Entrepreneurship in Macroeconomic Bureaucracies” (2017) 36 Pol’y & Soc’y 479
at 485 [Bakir].
117. See, for example, Tsuyoshi Kawasaki, “Policy ideas and change in Japanese bureaucratic
politics: Te ministry of fnance in international monetary crisis, 1969–1971” (1993) 13
J Pub Pol’y 111.
118. Te International Monetary Fund predicts that the world economy will shrink by 3 per
cent in 2020, compared to a 0.1 per cent dip in the 2008 recession. See United States,
World Economic Outlook, April 2020: Te Great Lockdown (International Monetary Fund,
2020), online (pdf ): IMF <www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2020/04/14/
World-Economic-Outlook-April-2020-Te-Great-Lockdown-49306>.
119. King, supra note 88 at 99.
120. Joo-Youn Jung, “Reinventing the interventionist state: Te Korean economic bureaucracy
reform under the economic crisis” (2008) 23 Pacifc Focus 121 at 132-33.
121. McNamara, supra note 88 at 48-49.
122. Juliet Johnson, “Two-track difusion and central bank embeddedness: Te politics of Euro
adoption in Hungary and the Czech Republic” (2006) 13 Rev Intl Pol Econ 361.
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Te existence of class proceedings legislation in the US and Quebec exerted
a profound infuence on the reform movement in Ontario.123 Similarly, the
existence of a developed online tribunal in British Columbia, as well as a push
towards online courts around the world,124 could prove infuential in Ontario
today.125 Developments in other jurisdictions provide a “laboratory” for Ontario
to see if online courts are sufciently efective, and Ontario can then implement
those policies.126 However, although much of the international and academic
discussion has looked to the online processes of BC and England & Wales in
particular, the debates in the Ontario Bar have been fairly insular127 and have
generally not considered developments in other jurisdictions.
Endogenous facilitators of change include political will and “policy
entrepreneurs” who shape the nature and direction of reform.128 Policy
entrepreneurs are able to steer change at all levels of public policy, playing the
role of politician, bureaucrat, academic, spin-doctor, and mediator between
interest groups. Tey “build broad coalitions supporting their entrepreneurship
activity in the domestic political economy.”129 Te policy entrepreneur at the
helm of class action reform in Ontario was Attorney General Ian Scott, who
flled each of the aforementioned roles in his eforts to bring about reform.130
With a background in environmental law, Scott was passionate about access to

123. Chiodo, supra note 103 at 20-26, 39-44, 65.
124. Remote Courts Worldwide provides a comprehensive list of initiatives, see “Remote Courts
Worldwide” (last visited 12 July 2020), online: Remote Courts Worldwide <remotecourts.org>.
125. An infuential supranational institution is the United Nations. See the United Nations Ofce
on Drugs and Crime, Ensuring Access to Justice in the Context of COVID-19 (May 2020),
online (pdf ): UNODC <www.unodc.org/documents/Advocacy-Section/Ensuring_Access_
to_Justice_in_the_Context_of_COVID-191.pdf>. Te recent report of the UN Ofce on
Drugs and Crime emphasized the importance of addressing the backlog of cases (including
in civil proceedings), understanding the need for people-centred justice, and providing legal
empowerment strategies (at 36-38). Te report stated that this could be done by “building
on some of the ICT [information, communication, and technology] gains that may have
been achieved during the crisis and continuing with remote court hearings and other judicial
proceedings” (ibid at 36).
126. Bakir, supra note 116 at 485. See also King, supra note 88 at 99.
127. Brown interview 2, supra note 66.
128. King, supra note 88 at 96, 113, 117; Kawasaki, supra note 117 at 125; see also Bakir supra
note 116 at 485, 489.
129. Bakir supra note 116 at 489.
130. Chiodo, supra note 103 at 171-88.
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justice and the funding of public interest litigation.131 Te subject of class action
reform had languished at the MAG for at least a decade before Scott took up
the subject.132 It was his determination to mediate a consensus between warring
interest groups, and to fght resistance in his own Ministry, that fnally led to the
enactment of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.133
Does the same political will and leadership exist in the current climate?
Perhaps. Te Attorney General has stated on several occasions that he wishes to
use the current crisis as an opportunity to modernize Ontario’s justice system,
and has spoken of “hav[ing] the system deal with the reality” of self-represented
litigants.134 Chief Justice Morawetz has reported that Downey is lending full
support to the process of modernization, and ensuring that his Ministry’s
bureaucracy does so too.135 Te specifcs are somewhat lacking, however, and
appear to be limited to digitizing existing processes and expanding the use of
hearings by videoconference.136 Nevertheless, Downey could play the role of
a “policy entrepreneur”. His experience as a real estate lawyer, court clerk and
court registrar,137 as well as his Master’s degree in judicial administration, would
give him a good knowledge of the workings of the court system, as well as the
potential for reform. He has drawn upon the example of Teranet, Ontario’s
online real estate search and registration system, which brought about a radical
131. Ian Scott and N McCormick, To Make a Diference: A Memoir (Stoddart, 2001) at 57,
134-35, 175; Ian Scott and Raj Anand, “Financing Public Participation in Environmental
Decision Making” (1982) 60 Can Bar Rev 81 at 114-19; Chiodo, supra note
103 at 52, 136-37.
132. In November 1976, Attorney General Roy McMurtry wrote to Allan Leal, Chairman of
the Ontario Law Reform Commission, asking the OLRC to research the advisability of
enacting class actions legislation in Ontario. Scott frst conducted consultations on reform in
December 1988: Chiodo, supra note 103 at 54-55, 174.
133. Chiodo, ibid, at 142-46, 159-60, 174-78, 180-82.
134. See, for example, Marg Bruineman, “Justice system is in fux; ‘we’re not
going back to normal,’ says Downey” (22 May 2020), online: Orillia
Matters <www.orilliamatters.com/coronavirus-covid-19-local-news/
justice-system-is-in-fux-were-not-going-back-to-normal-says-downey-2368811>.
135. Morawetz Fireside Chat, supra note 42.
136. Bruineman, supra note 134; Anita Balakrishnan, “MAG Doug Downey commits to
permanent modernization for remote notarizing, commissioning” (14 May 2020), online:
Canadian Lawyer <www.canadianlawyermag.com/resources/professional-regulation/
mag-doug-downey-commits-to-permanent-modernization-for-remote-notarizingcommissioning/329628>; John Lancaster, “How COVID-19 helped push Ontario’s low-tech
justice system into the 21st century” (4 June 2020), online: CBC News <www.cbc.ca/news/
canada/toronto/covid-19-technology-courts-ontario-1.5596643>.
137. Bruineman, ibid.
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transformation in the practice of real estate law in the province.138 He therefore
understands that law is a service, not just a profession, and that most clients do
not want lawyers—they want a solution to their legal problem.139
Chief Justice Morawetz has also noted the need for a “full end-to-end
electronic fling system” with e-fling available to the profession and e-document
delivery for the judiciary, and is leading the ONSC in this regard.140 He reports
that such a system could be up and running within a year (at least on an
interim basis), with e-scheduling available in the medium- to long-term.141 Te
implementation of e-scheduling alone would save thousands of hours that are
currently wasted in scheduling court (where the numerous individuals that are
required to wait around also constitute a health hazard).
Other “policy entrepreneurs” are also calling for fundamental reform,
although their power to efect change in Ontario is limited. Supreme Court of
Canada Chief Justice Richard Wagner has supported the move towards written
advocacy and virtual hearings, and is also open to the solutions proposed by
Susskind, involving “online judging that leans on paper-based adjudication and
asynchronous means to communicate with parties.”142 Chief Justice Wagner
leads the Action Committee on Court Operations in Response to COVID-19
with Federal Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada David Lametti,
and the Action Committee has emphasized that “decisions around resumption
of court operations [should be] framed within a wider vision of courts
modernization.”143 Similarly, former Chief Justice of Canada Beverley McLachlin

138. Elizabeth Raymer, “Justice modernization ‘window is open’, says BC’s top judge,
speaking on courts, virtual advocacy” (23 May 2020), online: Canadian Lawyer <www.
canadianlawyermag.com/practice-areas/litigation/justice-modernization-window-is-opensays-b.c.s-top-judge-speaking-on-courts-virtual-advocacy/329843>.
139. Tis outcome-based approach is endorsed elsewhere, see Brown interview 2, supra note 66;
Susskind, supra note 4 at 47-53; Roadmap, supra note 17 at 9.
140. Amanda Jerome, “‘Paper-based system is not going to exist anymore,’ Chief Justice
Morawetz says of post-COVID-19 court” (15 April 2020), online: Te Lawyer’s Daily <www.
thelawyersdaily.ca/articles/18576>; Brown interview 2, supra note 66.
141. Morawetz Fireside Chat, supra note 42.
142. Schmitz, “Wagner,” supra note 93; Susskind, supra note 4.
143. Cristin Schmitz, “National COVID-19 action committee issues frst guidance for reopening
courts during pandemic” (28 May 2020), online: Te Lawyer’s Daily <www.thelawyersdaily.
ca/articles/19244/national-covid-19-action-committee-issues-frst-guidance-for-reopeningcourts-during-pandemic>.
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has invoked Susskind’s work in calling for a “vision-based” transformation of the
justice system.144
Te prospects for virtual hearings and electronic processes are promising
and they are likely to remain post-pandemic. However, more fundamental
transformation is needed in order to address the ills of cost, delay, and access that
have plagued the civil justice system.

V. BEYOND TINKERING – ONLINE COURTS
A. ZOOM AND GLOOM – THE PROBLEM WITH DIGITIZING EXISTING
PROCESSES

While the recent changes are a move in the right direction, they have raised
questions about how innovative and efective they are. Civil procedure remains
largely unchanged except for the fact that some steps are now online. Te path
currently being pursued by Ontario’s justice stakeholders would seem very familiar
to earlier developers of online dispute resolution systems. Tese developers did
not attempt to disrupt or transform existing processes, but simply mimicked
existing processes and ofered online equivalents.145 As Ethan Katsh and Orna
Rabinovich-Einy have observed:146
[T]he initial impulse is to create online mirror images of the ‘live’ or ofine process.
In such instances, some agencies aim to replicate exactly their current processes
online. Public agency staf may have been using the existing system for so long that
it may be difcult for them to envision the new system as something other than an
online replica of their ofine process.

Replace “public agency staf” with “lawyers”, and this observation applies to the
situation in Ontario.147 Lawyers report that virtual hearings are just like attending
144. Beverley McLachlin, “Access to Justice: Visionary thinking to update a legacy system”
(12 May 2020), online: Te Lawyer’s Daily <www.thelawyersdaily.ca/articles/19008/
access-to-justice-visionary-thinking-to-update-a-legacy-system-beverley-mclachlin>;
Beverley McLachlin, “Access to Justice: Justice in the time of social distancing” (31
March 2020), online: Te Lawyer’s Daily <www.thelawyersdaily.ca/articles/18386/
access-to-justice-justice-in-the-time-of-social-distancing-beverley-mclachlin>.
145. Richard Susskind describes this phenomenon as automation (using technology to deliver
old services) as opposed to transformation (using technology to deliver services that would
have been unthinkable without technology). See Susskind, supra note 4 at 34. See also James
Allsop, “Technology and the Future of the Courts” (2019) 38 UQLJ 1 at 10.
146. Digital Justice, supra note 97 at 33.
147. See also Anuj Moudgil et al, “Virtual hearings: are they really the answer?”, Lexology (17
April 2020), online: Lexology <https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=1f28280262f6-4cc6-890a-6a5a8ee5ecee> [Moudgil].
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a diferent court for the frst time. Te “Best Practices for Remote Hearings”148
is regarded as the new companion to the Rules of Civil Procedure, and it is likely
to be formally incorporated into the Rules in the near future. Colin Stevenson,
President of the OBA, has stated that, in the wake of COVID-19, “we were able
to launch virtual courtrooms and to train judges to manage hearings in a way that
approximated a real court as closely as possible.”149 Our court system has simply
moved online, replacing physical courtrooms with virtual ones.150
Tis is reminiscent of the early days of the automobile. Early vehicle
prototypes were simply horseless carriages, with a small combustion engine
replacing the horse. While this removed the inconvenience of feeding, stabling,
and cleaning up after horses, the new mode of transport was just as slow, reaching
speeds of up to 16 km/h—about the same as a trotting horse.
Tis is why the recent changes will not be very efective in solving the
problems that have plagued the civil justice system for decades. Expecting
hearings by Zoom to address issues of cost, delay, and accessibility is like
expecting a Benz Patent-Motorwagen to outrun a horse and buggy. Tis is
because the use of virtual courts, while removing the cost and inconvenience
of travel to court, does not result in the removal of any procedural steps. Te
cost and time savings will therefore be relatively modest.151 Te scheduling of
hearings will still depend on the availability of judges and counsel, as well as the
availability of the technology in the courts concerned. Te volume of materials
will continue to grow. Self-represented litigants will still struggle to navigate the
system.152 Te experience of hearings by videoconference and teleconference
148. Best Practices, supra note 30.
149. Colin Stevenson, “Leading the way forward: Modernizing access to justice” (25 May 2020),
online: Te Lawyer’s Daily <www.thelawyersdaily.ca/articles/19190>.
150. Even the technology is not particularly new. Although the functionality of videoconferencing
has improved in recent years, it has been around since the early 2000s; Skype was
established in 2003. Electronic fling has been widely available in British Columbia
since December 2008.
151. Dr. Natalie Byrom’s Rapid Review of the civil justice system in England & Wales following
COVID-19 suggests that remote hearings are not necessarily cheaper, and that savings relate
mostly to elimination of travel and accommodation costs. See UK Civil Justice Council, Te
Impact of COVID-19 on the Civil Justice System (CJC, 2020) at paras 5.1, 5.89-5.92 [CJC
Report]; Moudgil, supra note 147.
152. For example, the Best Practices is 42 pages long. See Best Practices, supra note 30. It refers
repeatedly to the numerous practice directions issued by the various levels of court in Ontario
in the wake of COVID-19, which some lawyers have called “almost impenetrable” (although
some have since been consolidated): Paul-Erik Veel and Chantelle Cseh, “Practicing
Litigation Remotely” (7 April 2020), Ontario Bar Association Webinar Series, “Maintaining
Your Litigation Practice in a Remote Work Environment”.
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in other jurisdictions has raised serious concerns about accessibility and other
issues.153 If we simply “graft a digital layer onto the existing procedural systems”,
then “they can generate compounding negative externalities at a systemic level”,
including procedural unfairness.154 Richard Susskind confrmed this when giving
evidence to the House of Lords Constitution Committee on the implications of
COVID-19, stating that the aim of reform should not be to “take the English
justice system and drop it into Zoom” but to “radically redesign the system”
to improve access to justice.155
Te legal system in Ontario has been modernized by twenty-fve years in
twenty-fve days, as the Attorney General said, but this has simply brought the
legal system from the age of the fax machine to the age of the Internet. Our
courts are still twenty years behind. Te risk of “tinkering at the edges” of civil
procedure “is that the wholesale introduction of virtual hearings could lull parties
and [courts] into thinking that they have been innovative enough in moving to
a virtual environment.”156 Te somewhat self-congratulatory tone surrounding
many of the recent reforms indicates that that risk is alive and well in Ontario.
Simply moving hearings online is a missed opportunity to take a more
sophisticated approach to the civil litigation process, and cure many of its ills
along the way. Jurisdictions such as British Columbia and England & Wales have
taken an innovative approach to the resolution of certain disputes, and Ontario
would do well to learn from them.
B. ONLINE COURTS – A TRUE TRANSFORMATION FOR ACCESS TO
JUSTICE
153. Amy Salyzyn, “‘Trial by Zoom’: What Virtual Hearings Might Mean for Open Courts,
Participant Privacy and the Integrity of Court Proceedings” (17 April 2020), online: Slaw
<www.slaw.ca/2020/04/17/trial-by-zoom-what-virtual-hearings-might-mean-for-opencourts-participant-privacy-and-the-integrity-of-court-proceedings>; CJC Report, supra
note 151; Nufeld Family Justice Observatory, Remote hearings in the family justice system:
a rapid consultation (NFJO, 2020). Tese publications raised concerns about virtual hearings
involving self-represented litigants, as well as the “open court” principle, issues regarding
the “digital divide” (access for those without the resources to purchase required technology),
and privacy. Salyzyn notes that videoconferencing can have potentially adverse impacts on
credibility assessments and emotional connections between courtroom participants.
154. Philip Holdsworth, “Virtual law in a post-COVID-19 era: will justice thrive in a
Zoom future?” (9 May 2020), online: Medium <medium.com/@philipholdsworth/
virtual-law-in-a-post-covid-19-era-will-justice-thrive-in-a-zoom-future-d640a1743e91>.
155. Michael Cross, “Let’s be modest with change says online courts guru Susskind” (4 June
2020), online: Law Society Gazette <www.lawgazette.co.uk/practice/lets-be-modest-withchange-says-online-courts-guru-susskind/5104504.article>.
156. Moudgil, supra note 147.
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In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, Ontario’s civil justice system moved
from physical courtrooms to virtual hearings. Tis is one small step in the right
direction. A giant leap, however, would be the use of online courts. Richard
Susskind defnes online courts as “an online service to which appropriate cases
will be allocated; a court with a simplifed body of rules; constructed from the
ground up on the back of technology rather [than] grafting technology onto
existing court processes; and designed to be accessible to non-lawyers.”157
Te simplifcation of processes and the use of technology to transform civil
justice, instead of simply facilitating existing processes, is the key to addressing
issues of cost, delay, and accessibility. Tis is exemplifed in the BC CRT, which
has four stages to its process:158
Stage one – Exploration: Te Solution Explorer is a web-based system that
guides parties as to the nature of their legal problem and potential solutions.
Tis provides self-help tools that may help solve the problem before it becomes
a fully-fedged dispute. If further help from the CRT is required, then a case will
formally be started.
Stage two – Negotiation: Te opportunity to negotiate directly with the other
party in order to resolve the matter, with little intervention from the CRT.159
Stage three – Facilitation: A CRT facilitator helps the parties come to a
consensual agreement.
Stage four – Adjudication: A CRT member adjudicates the dispute and
reaches a binding decision.
Each of these stages is remote (so that parties are not required to attend a
physical courthouse) and asynchronous (so that parties can make submissions
and deal with their disputes at times that are convenient to them). Tey increase
accessibility, because they are designed to simplify the process and guide
self-represented litigants with plain language and pre-populated forms. Tey also
reduce cost, because they “triage” disputes such that dispute resolution by an
adjudicator is the step of last resort. Finally, they reduce delay, because, if the

157. Susskind, supra note 4 at 63.
158. Salter & Tompson 2017, supra note 17 at 128-34. Tese cover three areas of Susskind’s
four-stage process: dispute avoidance, dispute containment, and dispute resolution. See
Susskind, supra note 4 at 114. Te Solution Explorer also touches on Susskind’s fourth stage:
legal health promotion (helping people know about the benefts and remedies to which the
law entitles them).
159. Stages 1 and 2 help users understand the relevant law and the options available to them,
and also ofer negotiation and early neutral evaluation. In this sense, the CRT fts within
Susskind’s defnition of an extended court. See Susskind, supra note 4 at 6, 61.
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dispute is not resolved early on in the process, then the issues are sufciently
narrowed by the last stage that a determination can be arrived at relatively quickly.
Te CRT recently reached its frst decision on liability and damages in a
motor vehicle accident (MVA) dispute, with the decision being released just ten
months after the MVA itself:160 three times faster than an almost identical case
that had previously been decided by the Supreme Court of British Columbia,161
and three times faster than the resolution of the average civil claim in the
ONSC.162 Simpler claims before the CRT are resolved in an average time of 3.5
months:163 four times faster than the resolution of a claim in Ontario’s Small
Claims Court.164 Tis is justice at light speed.165 Tose who argue that it is too fast
must contend with the proportionality principle: that the amount of time and
money spent on a dispute must be proportionate to the amount involved and the
importance and complexity of the issues. As noted above, cost and time are also
elements of justice.
C. AN ONLINE COURT FOR ONTARIO

Ontario should address the cost and delay endemic to its civil justice system by
adopting British Columbia’s approach. In doing so, the MAG should be guided
by lessons from the failure of the IJP and similar projects,166 as well as the success
of the CRT. Tese lessons can be summarized as follows:
First, start small. Grandiose projects like the IJP leave a lot of room for
failure, and are much more prone to unrealistic timelines and costs projections.167
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Williams v Balogh, 2020 BCCRT 551.
Kelly v Yuen, 2010 BCSC 1794.
Auditor General’s Report, supra note 10 at 98-99.
Civil Resolution Tribunal, 2018/2019 Annual Report (Civil Resolution Tribunal, 2019) at 6.
Auditor General’s Report, supra note 10 at 98-99.
Since the CRT began operations, notices of objection have been fled in 2.5 per cent of
all small claims disputes, and appeals have been fled in 2.5 per cent of all strata disputes.
See “CRT Statistics Snapshot – November 2019,” online: CRT <civilresolutionbc.ca/
crt-statistics-snapshot-november-2019> [perma.cc/3DMY-R4WP].
166. As noted above, British Columbia and New Brunswick also failed in their attempts to
integrate their justice systems, around the time of the failure of the IJP: Baar, supra note 70
at 45-46, 49-52, 54. Richard Susskind describes the failure of similar projects in England &
Wales: supra note 4 at 243-44.
167. Te MAG seems to have implicitly acknowledged this, as changes in the last ffteen years or
so have been incremental and largely restricted to certain sectors of the civil justice system:
for example, the Digital Hearing Workspace for the Commercial List in the Toronto Region
(introduced in March 2019), and the Online System for Court Attendance Reservations
(OSCAR) piloted on the Estates List in October 2007 and expanded to the Commercial
List by early 2009.
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Te MAG would be wise to heed Richard Susskind’s “call for realism and
humility”168 and focus on a small, manageable area in which to pilot an online
court.169 Piloting allows new systems to be tested and then refned with feedback
from users,170 which is what the CRT has done and continues to do.171
Second, start with low-value claims. Te jurisdiction of the CRT includes
small claims up to $5,000 and strata (condominium) disputes. Now the tribunal
has been operating efectively for several years, its jurisdiction has expanded to
include motor vehicle accidents (MVAs) up to a value of ffty-thousand dollars,
and it will soon cover almost all MVA personal injury claims.172 As Susskind has
noted, “so-called ‘disruptive technologies’ … are most successful when they start
experimentally and modestly at the lower end of any given market,”173 so that the
impact of any errors or issues is minimized. As the systems become refned and
enhanced, they can take on more complex work, and “[i]n time, they become the
standard way of working.”174
Tird, start new. While I conclude in this article that, for the time being,
modernization is likely to stop at the digitization of current court processes, there
is no reason why a fully online tribunal for certain claims could not be established
at the same time. In fact, this is almost exactly what Susskind recommends.175
Tat would avoid many of the problems with “tinkering” and institutional
malaise described above, and would enable the capture of data (so that the system
could be tested and refned) in a way that is not possible in the current system.
Disseminating data about the tribunal’s work would also promote the open court

168. Susskind, supra note 4 at 244.
169. Carl Baar discussed Nova Scotia’s much more modest (and successful) re-engineering of
the Courts and Registries Division of the Department of Justice. Tis involved automating
customer services in the small Registry of Joint Stock Companies, which handled all
registrations relating to business entities and provided public information about businesses in
Nova Scotia: Baar, supra note 70 at 52.
170. Susskind, supra note 4 at 247.
171. Shannon Salter, “Online Dispute Resolution and Justice System Integration: British
Columbia’s Civil Resolution Tribunal” (2017) 34 Windsor YB Access Just 112
at 128 [Salter].
172. Civil Resolution Tribunal, “Te CRT’s Jurisdiction Over Motor Vehicle Personal Injury
Claims Is Expanding” (Accessed 11 May 2020), online: Civil Resolution Tribunal <https://
civilresolutionbc.ca/expanding-jurisdiction-over-motor-vehicle-injury-claims/>.
173. Susskind, supra note 4 at 247.
174. Ibid.
175. Ibid: “it is hard to change a wheel on a moving car. Te solution to this dilemma …
is to build a new car, run the old and the new in parallel, and, over time, transfer the
passengers from old to new.”
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principle.176 Te exclusion of lawyers (as in the CRT’s small claims and strata
disputes) would avoid the problems with professional capture of new processes.
Fourth, start nimble. Bespoke IT solutions generally prove cumbersome
and expensive. Te CRT is proof that the risk of government technology failure,
as well as the glacial pace of traditional procurement processes, can be minimized
by using an of-the-shelf platform and then customizing it.177 In the CRT’s case,
its case management system is powered by Salesforce, which was customized by
local software design and development companies to create the Solution Explorer
and the CRT’s communications portal. In Ontario in the wake of COVID-19,
courts have begun to abandon older technology such as CourtCall in favour of
newer, widely available, and enormously popular solutions like Zoom.178 Any
of-the-shelf platform must also take into account privacy concerns. While the use
of Zoom initially raised such concerns, password protection and the introduction
of end-to-end encryption seem to have alleviated them.
Based on these lessons, the MAG would be well advised to circumvent the
court system altogether and create an entirely new tribunal to handle certain
types of claims, as happened in BC. Such a tribunal could be established relatively
quickly, using customized of-the-shelf software, and rely on fling fees for a good
part of its revenue. It would also be self-contained and restricted in scope, thereby
reducing its potential for failure.
Participation in the tribunal would be voluntary, so that litigants concerned
about procedural fairness can still utilize the traditional courts system. Concerns
with procedural fairness could also be addressed by way of iterative user feedback.
For example, through user satisfaction surveys, the CRT discovered that users fnd
the Solution Explorer much more useful when they had someone to help them
(a lawyer, friend, or family member). Te CRT is now looking at the possibility
176. Tis is one of the reasons the CRT makes monthly “Statistics Snapshots” and annual reports
available on its website.
177. See also Susskind, supra note 4 at 249. However, the example of the IJP again serves
as a warning: in that case, most of the software for the new systems also consisted of
“of-the-shelf ” applications, but project management underestimated the time it would take
to customize those applications and integrate them with other systems. In addition, four
Ontario courts were already using one of the applications and had found it to be defcient;
IJP project management knew the application was inadequate for use in the courts, yet
inexplicably selected it anyway. See Auditor General’s Report 2001, supra note 67 at 76-77.
178. Court of Appeal for Ontario, “Notice Regarding Videoconference Appearance Technology
(Zoom) (6 July 2020)”, online: OCA <https://www.ontariocourts.ca/coa/en/notices/
covid-19/zoom.htm>. Courts in other jurisdictions have been scheduling hearings with
Doodle, an online meeting scheduling tool: see Salt Lake City Justice Court, “Schedule Your
Court Date”, online: SLC <https://www.slc.gov/courts/2020/06/15/bookable-calendars/>.
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of making low-cost legal helpers available for users struggling with the process.179
Te CRT also makes an ofine process available for those who have difculties
accessing the Internet,180 and this should also be available in any online tribunal
in Ontario in order to address concerns about the “digital divide”.181
I would suggest that, as in BC, the new tribunal should be focused entirely
on small claims up to a certain fgure. Te thirty-fve thousand dollar limit in
Ontario’s small claims court would probably be too high—something closer
to the CRT’s limit of fve thousand dollars would be a better start—but the
amount could be increased if the tribunal is a success (i.e. if it attracts a signifcant
number of litigants that would otherwise have gone to small claims court, and
they are satisfed with the tribunal’s performance based on certain indicators).
Te new tribunal would be almost entirely online, and able to function without
the need for in-person hearings. Tis would diferentiate it from Ontario’s small
claims court, which has suspended operations for non-urgent matters until 2
November 2020182—thereby barring access to justice for small claims for more
than half a year.

VI. CONCLUSION – LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
Given the limited prospects for fundamental reform in Ontario’s civil justice
system, then, what hope is there for online courts in the province? If the backlog
becomes as overwhelming as it did in British Columbia, the Attorney General
may, as I have recommended in this article, choose to outsource smaller value civil
claims to a separate online tribunal. It is unlikely that this will happen in the near
future, however.183 Justice priorities in the immediate future will almost certainly
be focused on addressing the backlog by modernizing the existing court system.

179. BC Civil Resolution Tribunal, “Study Update” (25 May 2020), online: CRT <https://
civilresolution.trubox.ca/2020/05/25/study-update/>. Te CRT states that the cost of
lawyers means they are not a realistic solution.
180. Salter, supra note 171 at 114.
181. Tis concept is defned supra note 153.
182. Superior Court of Justice – Small Claims Court, “Continued suspension of Small Claims
Court operations due to COVID-19”, online: SCJ <https://www.ontariocourts.ca/scj/
notices-and-orders-covid-19/continued-suspension-scc-operations/>. Settlement conferences
in non-urgent matters are being heard remotely.
183. Contra Jordan Furlong, “Pandemic III: Justice Reconstructed” (2 April 2020), online: Law21
<www.law21.ca/2020/04/pandemic-iii-justice-reconstructed>. Furlong predicts that, “by
the end of this year, most Canadian provinces will have their own CRTs either in rapid
development or up and running” (ibid).
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It therefore seems that reform will stop at the digitization of the existing
system. Tat is a good start, but it is not sufcient. As Jordan Furlong has stated,
“[y]ou can’t apply a Band-aid when you need a DNA replacement.”184 Tere is
general agreement that the court system in Ontario has been too slow, too costly,
and inaccessible for too long, and that the current crisis will only exacerbate
the backlog. Moving current procedures online will not reduce this backlog and
will only replicate the errors of the past. We need to do better and begin to
fundamentally transform our justice system in the interests of those who come
to it for the resolution of their disputes. It would do little good to modernize our
courts, only to be left with a system that is as slow, expensive, and inaccessible
as the old one.

184. Jordan Furlong, “Pandemic II: Justice system down” (2 April 2020), online: Law21 <www.
law21.ca/2020/04/pandemic-ii-justice-system-down>.

